Women are fecund for a shorter period of their lives than men. In monogamous societies with divorce and remarriage, fecund women are relatively scarce. This paper studies how parents, who maximize discounted dynastic consumption, invest in the survival of their sons and daughters. The theory also generates endogenous sex ratios, income class sizes and population growth. * We thank the referee for especially insightful comments. We also thank Angelo Melino, Mike Peters and seminar participants at
Introduction
Women are fecund for a shorter period of their lives than men. Since having children is a major rationale for marriage, in monogamous societies with divorce and remarriage, fecund women are relatively scarce in the marriage market. Men who are unable to marry will not have children. If individuals maximize discounted dynastic consumption ala Barro (1974) , Becker and Barro (1988) , should they invest differently in the survival of sons versus daughters? 1 In an influential paper, Trivers and Willard (1973;  hereafter TW) provide an answer. We paraphrase their model as follows. First, the evolutionary fitness maximization hypothesis implies that men and women act as if they maximize the discounted expected number of descendents. Second, due to child bearing and menopause, women are fecund for shorter periods of their lives than men. Third, if adults can have multiple spouses, males with a lot of resources may have multiple spouses. In this case, males with few resources may have no spouse. Since fecund females are scarce, rich or poor females are likely to have spouses.
Fourth, offsprings of rich parents are more likely to be rich compared with offsprings of poor parents. Therefore poor parents should be biased towards investing in the health of their daughters because poor daughters are more likely to have offsprings compared with poor 1 Other applications of differential fecundity include Aiyagari, Greenwood and Güner (2000), Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) , Betzig (1997) , Edlund (1999) , Edlund and Korn (forthcoming), Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2001) , Krebs and Davies (1991) , Ridley (1993) , Siow (1998) , Trivers (1972) , Willis (1999) . While analytically less sophisticated, the non-economics literature is much larger and considers a wider range of hypotheses and environments.
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depends only on the skill of the parents. 3 Adults are differentiated by marital status, skill level and fecundity. Fecund women are relatively scarce and they command scarcity rents in the marriage market. Parents take into account the future matching and consumption prospects of their offsprings when they invest in their children.
Our model predicts that wealthier men are more likely to have multiple spouses, poor men are more likely to be unmarried, women are more likely to be married than men, and the resources of children are positively correlated with that of their parents. But unlike TW, this model does not generate unambiguous predictions about gender biased parental investments in health and the wealth of the parents. In our model, parents maximize an expected discounted stream of dynastic consumption. Due to differential fecundity and gains from assortative matching, high skilled fecund females are relatively scarce and expropriate most of the gains from assortative matching. These consumption rents of children are valued by parents if they discount dynastic consumption. But they are not valued if parents only value the number of descendents. If parents value dynastic consumption, the consumption rents of high skilled daughters may outweigh the discounted consumption of extra descendents that high skilled sons may have. Thus in this model, parents may not favor the survival of sons more as their wealth increase. If the gains to assortative matching are large, in contrast to the TW hypothesis, parents will invest relatively more in the health of their daughters as their wealth grows. The TW hypothesis is more likely to hold when the gains from assortative matching are limited. The model also provide a model of endogenous sex ratios, income class sizes and population growth.
The paper borrows liberally from the research program on the economics of the family (Rosenzweig and Stark (1997) ). Bergstrom (1994) used the TW hypothesis and a branching model of the family to explain primogeniture in seventeen century Britain and other stratified societies. Edlund (1999) studies the TW hypothesis when differential fecundity and endogamy are important concern.
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Our model of population growth provides a contribution to behavioral two-sex demographic models (Pollak (1990) ).
The Model
The society has one physical good.
Male and female adults are potentially infinitely lived. Each adult who is alive in the current period, will live in the next period with probability β. For any variable α, α = 1− α.
Thus β = 1 − β is the death hazard. The discount factor of an individual is δ < 1.
In the first period of their adult lives, all individuals are fecund. Males continue to be fecund for the rest of their lives. Each fecund female has probability µ of remaining fecund in the next period. Infertility is irreversible. Differential fecundity is the only exogenous difference between males and females in this society.
Adults also differ by skill levels. There are two skill levels, high (h) and low (l). An adult with skill level j will have j amount of income to spend in each period of his or her life.
The skill levels of a husband and wife pair may also interact in the production of skills of their children. We do not distinguish between investing in market versus non-market skills.
Thus high and low skills in this model do not correspond to high and low market skills in a 4 She observes that the TW hypothesis may hold within social classes and not for the whole society.
multi-good world.
Adult males and females may marry. Abstracting from all other roles for marriage, adults choose to marry because they want to have children. A marriage can end in two ways. If the wife becomes infertile, the couple divorces because there is no further gain from continuing the marriage. The marriage also ends when a spouse dies. A fecund widow or widower may remarry. A divorced man may remarry. Since the only reason to marry is to have children, divorced women will not remarry.
At the beginning of every period of a marriage, the wife will give birth to ω boys and ω girls. The children's survival probability is a function of the parents' health investment. If the parents invest z units of the consumption good on the health of a child at a cost of Γ(z), then the child will survive in the current period with probability min{v 0 + z, v 1 }, where v 0 and v 1 are such that 0 < v 0 < v 1 ≤ 1. We assume that Γ(.) is a quadratic cost function:
If a boy survives, with probability σ(S, s), the boy will acquire a high skill level, h, as an adult in the next period (the second period of his life). In general, we denote male variables and choices with lower case letters and female variables and choices with upper case letters. With probability σ(S, s), the boy will acquire a low skill level, l, as an adult. If a girl survives, she will acquire skill level h with probability σ(S, s) and skill level l with probability σ(S, s). For purely pedagogical convenience, we assume parents cannot transfer resources to their offsprings when their offsprings become adults.
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Thus all parental investments in an 5 Due to our transferable utility assumption, the inability to make transfers will have no effect on equlibrium parental utilities, marital choices or investment decisions.
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offspring occurs in the first period of the offspring's life. When a child becomes an adult, the child is responsible for his or her own decisions. We ignore the children's consumption.
In every period, a parent consume two goods: (i) the expected discounted utilities of surviving offsprings born in that period and (ii) private consumption. The expected discounted utilities of offsprings born in that period is consumed by both parents and is thus a public good within the marriage.
As emphasized by Bergstrom (1997) and Weiss (1997) , it is convenient to use transferable utilities to model the preferences of parents when there are public and private goods within a household. With transferable utilities, parents who voluntarily choose to marry will produce the bilaterally efficient level of public good and transfer private consumption between them to satisfy any reservation utility constraint.
So we assume that a parent's utility is linearly increasing in own consumption and offsprings' utilities. More specifically, the present discounted expected utility of an adult in
where c t+f is consumption of the adult in period t + f , χ t+f is an indicator function which equals one if the adult is married in period t + f and zero otherwise, p t+f and P t+f are respectively the survival probability of boys and girls in period t + f , and b r t+f and b V t+f are respectively the expected utilities of a boy and a girl when they become adult in period t + f + 1.

Health Investments and Gains from Marriage
This section studies the optimal health investment decisions of parents taking the expected discounted utilities of surviving children as given. We consider efficient stationary marriage market equilibria where the expected value (expected discounted lifetime utility) of men and women is constant overtime. For j = l, h, let r j and V j be the value of men and women with skill level j, respectively. Let
, and θ = (r, V). Parents take the values of their adult children, θ, as given. They do not control the future actions of their children. When their children become adults, the children will make their own decisions. The value of these decisions to the parents is summarized by θ.
In each period, a married couple of skills S and s will have ω boys and ω girls. They will have to decide on how much to invest on the survival of the children. Consider a couple with a young son. The return to the son, whether r h or r l , is available only in the next period when the child becomes an adult. Thus the parents discount this return by δβ. The return is also a public good, consumed by both parents. That is, if a son achieves a value of r s , combined parental utility increases by 2δβr s . So from the point of view of the couple, the expected value of the son is:
Likewise, from the point of view of the couple, the expected value of a daughter is:
Given b r and b V , parents have to decide how much to invest in the survival of their children.
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The expected value from investing optimally in the survival of the children is
π Ss (θ) represents the marital output of the couple for each period in which they are married.
It is the per period gains to marriage for the couple relative to being single. A marriage market equilibrium will divide this output between them.
When there is an interior solution, π Ss (θ) can be expressed as:
Assumption 1: σ is supermodular and increasing in S and s.
When σ(S, s) is differentiable, supermodularity implies that its cross partial derivatives are all non-negative. If the cross partial derivatives are all positive, we say the function σ(S, s)
is strictly supermodular. In this case, the skills of fathers and mothers are complementary in their children's human capital. We do not require the function to be strictly supermodular to allow for the possibility that S and s enter additively: σ(x, S, s) = a(x) + bS + bs.
Under Assumption 1, the following proposition can be proved using standard arguments (ii) The marriage production function π Ss (θ) is strictly positive, strictly supermodular as function of S, s, and θ, and strictly increasing in θ.
The positivity and monotonicity of the marriage production function π Ss (θ) imply that all individuals prefer to be married and married with a high skilled partner. The supermodularity of the marriage production function also implies that positive assortative matching is efficient. We will also refer to supermodularity of the marriage production function as complementarity in marital production.
Conditional on survival, b r(S, s, r) and b V (S, s, V) represent the expected net return of a son and a daughter, respectively. Noting that v 1 − v 0 is the maximum possible health investment, the optimal health investments, i * (S, s, r) and I * (S, s, V), are:
Comparing (5) and (6), parents will invest more on the health of their daughter if the expected net return from her is higher than that from their son and vice versa.
Consider the case when the cost parameter γ is large enough so that both i * and I * are less than v 1 − v 0 . Take the derivative of i * with respect to S in (5) and using the envelope theorem to get:
That is, optimal health investment in a son is increasing in the skill of the mother. By symmetry, it is also increasing in the skill of the father. Likewise, the optimal health investment in a daughter is also increasing in parental skills:
Comparing (7) and (8), then, we have
If ∆r > ∆V as assumed by TW, then the TW hypothesis follows.
Proposition 2 For large γ, the TW hypothesis is true if and only if ∆r > ∆V in equilibrium.
In the following we will characterize conditions under which ∆r > ∆V is consistent with marriage market equilibrium.
Marriage Market Equilibrium
Marriage is an assignment of adult men to adult fecund women and a sharing rule that determines how marriage output is distributed between the two partners in a marriage.
When a couple agrees to a specific division of marital output and marries, we assume that this agreed upon division is enforced. We consider marriage market equilibria where the assignment is stable:
(i) There is no married person who would rather be single.
(ii) There are no two married (or unmarried) persons who prefer to form a new union.
With transferable utility, stable assignment implies that parents always choose their investments to maximize the marital output, independent of the sharing rule, and that the Differential Fecundity and Gender Biased Parental Investments in Health marriage output is distributed efficiently between the two partners.
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So, for any given expected value of men and women in the future, θ, the per period output of a Ss marriage is π Ss (θ), as defined in (1)-(??).
Let a Ss (θ) be the portion of the per period marital output that is allocated to the man in a continuous Ss marriage (not necessarily to the same woman over his lifetime). Then, the lifetime utility of the man is
The first term of (10) is the present discounted value of consumption the man gets if he never gets married, and the second term is the present discounted value of consumption he gets from marriage. Similarly, the lifetime utility of the woman in a continuous Ss marriage
Since the woman remains married only if she stays fecund, her present value of consumption from marriage has to be discounted by δβµ instead of δβ.
If a man of skill level s stays being single, then his lifetime utility is
Similarly, if a woman of skill level S stays being single, then, her lifetime utility is
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In a stable assignment, all men with the same skill level should have the same lifetime utility, whether they are single, married to a low skilled woman, or married to a high skilled woman. For example, if men of skill level s are married to women of both skill types, then in equilibrium
Also, if some men of skill level s are single in equilibrium,
Likewise, all women with the same skill level and fecundity status must have the same lifetime utility independent of their marital status. Therefore, for any given θ, a person's lifetime utility depends on his or her type and is independent of his or her marital status. Let r s (θ)
be the value of men with skill level s and V S (θ) be the value of women with skill level S.
There are at most four possible types of marriages: Ss = hh, lh, hl, and ll. Since the marriage output function, π Ss (θ), is supermodular in S and s, negative assortative matching is inefficient in this society (Becker (1991) , Weiss (1997) ). Therefore in a stable assignment, type lh marriages and hl marriages cannot co-exist. If they co-existed, the h type spouses from the mixed marriages will be better off separating from their current marriages and marrying each other instead. Thus, there can be at most one of the two types of mixed marriages. We refer to a marriage of mixed types as an lh marriage.
For a given distribution of adult men and adult fecund women, ¡ n and adult fecund women in period t + 1 is given by the following equations:
Here,
We now define stationary equilibrium in this society.
Definition 3 A stationary equilibrium is a distribution of men and fecund women, (ii) Equation (12)- (15) hold for the sequence {x t , m t } t≥0 . Furthermore, there is a positive constant g such that x t+1 = gx t , and m t+1 = gm t , for all t ≥ 0.
(iii) r s (θ) = r s and V S (θ) = V S for s = l, h and S = l, h.
Condition (iii) in the definition of stationary equilibrium is a fixed point condition for θ.
Such a fixed point exists and is unique if the discount factor δ is small enough. In the rest of the paper, we will always assume that the discount factor is such that there exists a unique θ such that condition (iii) above is satisfied. (One sufficient upper bound for δ, for example,
Note that e N h + e N l = 1 by definition. So, there are more (less) men than fecund women if e n h + e n l > 1 (e n h + e n l < 1).
Existence and Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium
In general, there may exist many stationary equilibria with different distributions of men and women, depending on the properties of parental investment technologies and the degree of differential fecundity. Generic existence of equilibrium in two-sex demographic models is difficult to establish (Pollak (1990) ). We focus on cases where the scope for endogenous investments is limited.
Women can not be too abundant in a stationary equilibrium as long as there is differential fecundity (µ < 1). Assume otherwise. In this case, men will extract a larger share of marriage output than their partners in each marriage and they are more likely to be married due to Differential Fecundity and Gender Biased Parental Investments in Health their relative scarcity. Boys will be better off than girls and parents will invest more in boys, which implies that men will become more abundant, a contradiction. More precisely,
Proposition 4
There does not exist a stationary equilibrium in which there are both more fecund women than men (e n h + e n l < 1) and more high skilled women than high skilled men (e n h < e N h ).
Proof: Proofs of this and subsequent propositions are in Appendix A.
Without restrictions on the effectiveness of parents' investment in survival, differential fecundity alone can not exclude the possibility that there are more high skilled women than high skilled men but less fecund women than men, or the possibility that there are more fecund women than men but less high skilled women than high skilled men. In either of these cases, the expected value of a girl could be higher than the expected value of a boy so that parents will invest more in the survival of girls. If this investment is highly effective and the degree of differential fecundity is modest, the higher investment in girls than in boys could lead to more girls of a particular type in equilibrium.
In the context of this paper, we assume that the effectiveness of survival investment is bounded relative to differential fecundity. Then women will always be scarce in equilibrium.
Assumption 2:
The survival investment technology is such that
Note that condition (20) is satisfied if either the cost of survival investment γ is large enough or
Proposition 5 When a stationary equilibrium exists and Assumption 2 holds, in equilibrium, e n h + e n l > 1 and e n h ≥ e N h .
Proposition 6
Assume that Assumption 2. Then there exists a unique stationary equilibrium such that e n h + e n l > 1 and 1 > e n h > e N h if
and there exists a unique stationary equilibrium such that e n h > 1 > e N h if
In the equilibrium with e n h > 1, parents will always invest more in their daughters' health than in their sons'.
Differential fecundity implies that there will be more men than fecund women and more high skilled men than high skilled women in a stationary equilibrium. If the degree of differential fecundity is large enough, it is possible that the number of high skilled men will exceed the total number of fecund women in equilibrium: e n h > 1. Condition (23) provides a lower bound on the degree of differential fecundity such that e n h > 1 in equilibrium. Condition (22) , on the other hand, puts an upper bound on the degree of differential fecundity so that in equilibrium e N h < e n h < 1.
In the case when e n h > 1, women are so scarce that even some skilled men are single.
Women command all the rents in the marriage market. V l > r l and 4V > 4r. Parents will unambiguously favor girls. The TW hypothesis always fail. Thus the only equilibrium in which parents may favor boys is when the degree of differential fecundity is not too large so that e N h < e n h < 1. Even in such an equilibrium, however, it is still possible that parents favor girls. In the next two sections we discuss further restrictions that are needed to generate cases when parents favor boys.
A Back of the Envelope Calculation
In general, there is little information on the bounds discussed above for modern or historical societies. This section provides ball park estimates of the empirical plausibility of assumption 2 and the sufficient condition for a e N h < e n h < 1 equilibrium. Using 18th century data from (21), we need v 1 − v 0 < 0.093. In terms of observed gender differences in survival probabilities to adulthood 18th century Quebec, the bound is satisfied.
In order to satisfy equation (22) , the sufficient condition for a e N h < e n h < 1 equilibrium, we need v 0 − v 1 σ 1 > 0.093. That is, the likelihood of a surviving daughter should be larger than the likelihood that a high type family will produce a surviving high type son by 0.093.
In the Quebec context, this bound is satisfied. 
Gender Biased Parental Investments
The back of the envelope calculations suggest that, at least for some societies, the e N h < e n h < 1 equilibrium is plausible. It is also the only stationary equilibrium with potential variation in gender biased parental investments. Here we discuss how the marriage sharing rule will be determined in such an equilibrium and whether it will give rise to gender biased parental investment.
Since there are more men than fecund women, some low skilled men will be single.
Therefore,
All high skilled men will be married (e n h < 1). Let a h be the share of marriage output high skilled men receive. Then,
and
Since e N h < e n h , some high skilled men will marry low skilled women. Thus,
due to more of them residing in unhealthy urban communities and the wet nursing habits of the upper class. Assuming a child survival rate of 0.7, then the inequality is satisfied even with a σ 1 as large as 0.8.
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In a stable equilibrium, all high skilled men should receive the same payoff whether they marry high skilled or low skilled women. So, we have
Since e n h < 1, some low skilled women will marry low skilled men and receive π ll per period of marriage. In a stable equilibrium all low skilled women should have the same expected utility whether they are married to low or high skilled men. So, it must be true
By (9), a necessary and sufficient condition for the TW hypothesis to hold is when ∆r > ∆V .
Subtract (29) from (26) to get:
By (30), the lhs of (31) is positive if and only if
An interpretation of (32) is as follows. When survival investment is strictly between v 0
and v 1 , using the definition of π Ss in (4),
Using (33), a necessary condition for (32) is
or equivalently,
By complementarity of σ Ss ,
(34) puts a limit on this complementarity.
is the relative benefit of a longer marital life from being male. Since σ lh +σ ll σ hh +σ hl < 1, (35) puts also limit on the distance between σ hh and σ ll . Why is a bound on the gains to assortative matching necessary for parents to favor TW? If (32) fails, a high skilled couple will generate a lot more marital output relative to a mixed skill couple. Since this additional output accrues to the high skilled woman, ∆r > ∆V is less likely to hold.
On the other hand,
is sufficient for (32) to fail and thus for TW to fail. So if complementarity in σ Ss is sufficiently large, TW will not apply.
When ∆r = ∆V , parents will favor girls over boys because r l < V l . They will invest more on the health of girls than boys. From (9), more skillful parents will additionally invest in the survival of their children equally. The TW hypothesis does not apply.
When ∆r > ∆V and since r l < V l , (9) implies that the TW hypothesis applies. That is, with modest amount of complementarity in marriage, parents will invest relatively more on the survival of boys as their skills increase. V h may be larger or smaller than r h .
When ∆r < ∆V , according to (9) , parents will invest relatively more on the health of their daughter as their skills increase. In this case, the TW hypothesis does not apply.
In our model as in TW, resource rich males have more children than rich females.
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Resource rich parents invest more in the human capital of their children and thus are more likely to have rich children. But our parents maximize an expected discounted sum of dynastic consumption. In this case, resource rich parents do not necessarily choose to invest relatively more on the health of their sons compared with poor parents. Due to marital complementarity, skilled couples generate more marital output than mixed skilled couples.
Since fecund resource rich females are scarce relative to rich males, they expropriate all the rents from their relative scarcity. This rent will be large if marital complementarity is quantitatively significant. From the point of view of a parent, the extra own consumption of a resource rich female child relative to a poor female child may outweigh the discounted consumption of the extra descendents of a resource rich male child relative to that of a poor male child. Unlike TW, the value of a high skilled son may be less than that of a high skilled
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daughter and parents will invest relatively more on the survival of girls rather than boys as their wealth increase. On the other hand, even if the value of a high skilled son is less than that of a high skilled daughter, parents will invest relatively more on the survival of boys rather than girls as their wealth increase as long as ∆r > ∆V .
Since we have a one good model, it is difficult to evaluate the degree of compementarity and the quantity of children. The quality of children matters only as it affects the number of future descendents (Rogers (1990) ). It has no direct effect on parental welfare.
Differential Fecundity and Gender Biased Parental Investments in Health 6 Conclusion
An extension is to allow for concave utility functions where the marginal utility of consumption is not constant. This generalization will naturally bring in sibling effects. Search frictions in the marriage market should also be considered.
Another extension is to investigate other assumptions which make equilibrium in this class of two sex marriage models easier to obtain. For example, let the income of each type of worker depend on the total supply of that type in the population.
Siow and Zhu (2000) considered endogenous investments in skills as well as health. Another extension is to allow for parental and adult own investments in market and non-market skills (Echevarria and Merlo (1997) ).
Finally, the efficacy of the framework presented here for empirical research on gender biased parental investments remains to be investigated.
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Appendix A
Proof of the claim about the existence of fixed point: Define the sup-norm k.k on R 4 as follows: kxk = max {|x 1 |, |x 2 |, |x 3 |, |x 4 |}, and let T be the operator on R 4 defined by condition (iii) in the equilibrium definition. We now show that the operator T satisfies the Blackwell conditions for contraction mapping: (1) T is monotone, and (2) there exists a ζ ∈ (0, 1) such that kT (θ + α) k ≤ kT (θ) k + ζα for any θ ≥ 0 and α > 0. From Proposition 1 we know that the first condition is satisfied. Now, for any α > 0, we have
But using the envelope theorem we have
Thus,
then, by assumption, ζ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the Blackwell conditions are satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3: We prove by contradiction. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists.
Then, some low skilled women will be single since there are more fecund women than men.
So,
There are more high skilled women than high skilled men. So, all high skilled men will marry high skilled women, but some high skilled women will marry low skilled men. Let a h be the payoff received by a high skilled man from a hh marriage and a l be the payoff received by a low skilled man from a lh marriage. Then, we have
Since both high skilled and low skilled men have the option to marry low skilled women and receive π hl and π ll respectively, for them to be willing to marry high skilled women it must be true that a s ≥ π sl , s = l, h. Thus, we have
two of which imply that V l < r l , V h < r h and ∆V < ∆r. Therefore, parents will unambiguously invest more in boys than in girls. Given that there is differential fecundity, this implies that there will be more men than fecund women in equilibrium, which is a contradiction to the assumption. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4: From (16)- (19), we have
g − βµ = ω(P hh e m hh + P lh e m lh + P ll e m ll ).
If P hh ≤ p ll , then, it is trivial to see that e n > 
which implies that e n > 1.
¿From (17) and (19), we have
and e N h = ω(P hh σ hh e m hh + P lh σ lh e m lh + P ll σ ll e m ll )
But from (38) we have
So, from (20), we have
which implies that
By (39) 
By (17), we have (23) holds. We now show that in both cases the corresponding equilibrium exists and is unique.
Case (a). We need to show that there exist positive constants e N l , e N h , e n l , e n h and g such that
, e m ll = 1−e n h and equation (16)- (19) hold.
The Perron-Frobenius theorem implies that there exist a unique set of positive constants e N h , e n h and g that satisfy the following equations:
We first show that e N h < e n h < 1.
By (44) we have
Substituting (46) into (43),
By (45),
Since p hh σ hh ≤ v 1 σ 1 and P hh σ hh ≤ v 1 σ 1 from condition (22) we have
Thus, (47) implies that e n h < 1. From (46) (g − β) e n h = ω (p hh σ hh − p lh σ lh ) e N h + ωp lh σ lh ,
(g − βµ) e N h = ω (P hh σ hh − P lh σ lh ) e N h + ωP lh σ lh ,
g − βµ = ω (P hh − P lh ) e N h + ωP lh .
We now show that e n h > 1 > e N h .
By (51),
g − βµ − ωP hh σ hh = ω (P hh − P lh ) e N h + ωP lh − ωP hh σ hh = ω (P hh − P lh ) ³ e N h − 1´+ ωP hh (1 − σ hh ) .
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By (50) , then, we have e N h = P lh σ lh (P hh − P lh ) ³ e N h − 1´+ P hh (1 − σ hh ) + P lh σ lh .
If e N h ≥ 1, then (52) implies that e N h ≤ P lh σ lh P hh (1 − σ hh ) + P lh σ lh < 1.
So, it must be true that e N h < 1. From (49) and (50), we have e n h = ω (p hh σ hh − p lh σ lh )
ωP lh σ lh g−βµ−ωP hh σ hh +ωP lh σ lh + ωp lh σ lh g − βµ − β(1 − µ)
.
Since e N h < 1, from (51), g − βµ < ωP hh , and, therefore, e n h > ω (p hh σ hh − p lh σ lh )
P lh σ lh P hh −P hh σ hh +P lh σ lh + ωp lh σ lh ωP hh − β(1 − µ) .
But we have ω (p hh σ hh − p lh σ lh ) P lh σ lh P hh − P hh σ hh + P lh σ lh + ωp lh σ lh ≥ p lh σ lh ≥ v 0 σ 0 , and, from (23), ωP hh − β(1 − µ) ≤ ωv 1 − β(1 − µ) < ωv 0 σ 0 . 
